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Conflict-Induced Forced CEO Turnover and Firm Performance 
Jing Zhang 
 
We examine firm performance changes around forced CEO turnovers which are 
caused by conflicts between corporate boards and CEOs. We investigate firm 
performance using two measures: operating performance and abnormal stock returns. 
Many previous studies analyze firm performance changes around forced top 
management turnovers, but to date no one has examined conflict-induced CEO 
turnover events. Our results show that a firm’s operating performance declines 
preceding turnovers and improves following turnovers. However, unlike most 
previous studies, we find negative abnormal stock returns following CEO turnovers, 
suggesting that investors do not perceive CEO turnover announcements as good news 
when CEOs are dismissed for conflicts. We employ a unique hand-collected dataset 
on forced CEO turnovers as well as board and CEO characteristics and use 
multivariate regression analyses to test whether board and successor CEO 
characteristics influence a firm’s post-turnover firm performance. The results show no 
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Chief executive officer (CEO) turnover events have attracted wide attention from 
both researchers and practitioners, because these events are often followed by 
managerial team reorganization and firm performance variation. Turnover events are 
happening for various reasons, such as normal retirement, death or illness, the pursuit 
of another career, poor performance, and policy differences with boards. Many studies 
examine changes in performance around CEO turnover events, and some of them 
further investigate differences in firm performance between firms that experience 
forced turnovers and firms that experience voluntary turnovers (Furtado and Rozeff, 
1987; Denis and Denis, 1995; Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani, 1996; Huson, 
Malatesta, and Parrino, 2004; Adams and Mansi, 2009). However, very few studies 
have investigated firm performance changes by dividing forced CEO turnovers into 
more specific categories so far. Since boards are important in determining the 
direction of the firm when selecting a new CEO (Vancil, 1987; Weisbach, 1988; 
Lorsch and Maciver, 1989) and monitoring the performance of a CEO, and because 
the CEO is the key person in the management team whose decisions may influence 
firm performance, we are interested in the turnover related issues of the firms which 
experienced forced CEO turnovers that are caused by conflicts between boards and 
CEOs. 
Our study aims to explore performance changes around conflict-induced forced 
CEO turnovers. First, we examine the traits and characteristics of the outgoing CEO 
and successor CEO, by exploring whether he/she is an insider or outsider, what 
powers he/she is given, his/her age, etc. In addition, we examine what kind of board 
characteristics, including board size and percentage of outside directors, are present in 
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the sample firms. Second, we investigate how stock price and operating performance 
react to such events by examining the short-term and long-term abnormal stock 
returns and changes in operating return on assets around turnover events. In addition, 
we explore whether the board intends to change the firm’s business focus by entering 
a new market by initiating CEO turnovers. In this case, we look at the change in the 
number of the firms’ geographic segments, and examine whether the change affects 
the firms’ stock performance and operating performance. Finally, we analyze whether 
CEO characteristics and board characteristics have an impact on the firms’ stock 
performance and operating performance. Specifically, we consider the CEO’s age, 
compensation, ownership, etc. to see what kind of CEO and board can lead to better 
firm performance. Our results should not only be interesting for academics, but also 
for practitioners and regulators as they provide important insights about what factors 
may contribute to managerial entrenchment or more powerful boards. The results 
should also be of interest to investors as they will allow them to better interpret 
different types of CEO successions and their associated stock price impacts. Moreover, 
our study is the first to look at changes in firm’s geographic market focus around 
CEO turnovers, and their influence on firm performance. 
Our empirical results provide evidence that firm’s operating performance is 
deteriorating prior to turnovers, and then improving following the turnover 
announcements. The average number of firm’s geographic segments increase 
significantly through year -1 to year 1. Stock prices behave differently. In the 
short-term (i.e. over a four day window following the announcement day), abnormal 
returns are negative. In the subsequent twenty days, stock prices tend to recover. In 
the long-term, the abnormal return is significantly negative from 1 year before the 
turnover to 1 year after the turnover. In terms of regression analysis, any potential 
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effects of CEO and board characteristics on firm performance are not significant in 
our regression model. However, abnormal returns tend to decrease if another CEO 
turnover takes place within three years following a turnover event. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the 
literature related to CEO turnovers, firm performance, and board and CEO 
characteristics. Section 3 describes the data and the sample selection. In section 4 we 
introduce the methods that we use to examine firm performance and describe our 
models. The empirical results are reported and interpreted in section 5. Section 6 
provides concluding remarks and discusses possible extensions of our study. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Firm performance and the probability of CEO turnovers 
CEOs leave their positions for various reasons, among which poor performance 
is the most common one. First we discuss pre-turnover activities, and see under what 
situations boards may dismiss CEOs. Some of the first studies on CEO turnover and 
firm performance were conducted in the 1980s. Many of these studies concluded that 
firms with poor performance are more likely to experience CEO turnovers. Coughlan 
and Schmidt (1985) find that CEOs who are younger than 64 years of age, firm’s 
stock price performance is inversely related with the probability of a change in CEO 
leadership. Warner et al. (1988) report similar results which suggest that firms with 
poor stock returns are more likely to change their CEO, president, or chairman. 
Weisbach (1988) argues that in outsider-dominated firms, the likelihood of CEOs 
losing their job is higher if their firm experienced bad stock performance. In a more 
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recent study, Lausten (2002) observes an inverse relationship in Danish firms. 
However, Brickley (2003) points out that although the negative relation between CEO 
turnover and firm performance is statistically significant, its economic significance is 
very small. Also, firm performance has little power to explain the cross sectional and 
time-series variation in CEO turnovers. 
In more recent years, researchers have analyzed the conditions under which 
CEO turnovers occur. Specifically, some of the recent literature examines what events 
are leading to and which parties exert pressures to CEO turnovers. Poor firm 
performance by itself does not necessarily result in CEO turnover (Farrell and 
Whidbee, 2002). In fact, factors such as blockholder pressure, takeovers, financial 
wrongdoing, and/or lawsuits may lead to forced management resignations rather than 
normal board monitoring (Denis and Denis, 1995). Martin and McConnell (1991) 
show that poorly performing top managers are more likely to be forced to leave in the 
case of a takeover attempt, because a bidder who takes control of the firm tends to 
correct the non-value maximizing behavior of existing management. Farrell and 
Whidbee (2002) examine Wall Street Journal news stories about forced CEO 
turnovers, and find that scrutiny by the financial press will increase the probability of 
forced CEO turnovers. Defond and Hung (2003) suggest that strong law enforcement 
institutions have a higher possibility to dismiss their CEO for poor performance in 
order to protect their investors. Parrino et al. (2003) demonstrate that in cases in 
which institutional investors are dissatisfied with a firm’s management quality, they 
tend to put pressure on the firm by decreasing their ownership of the firm. They thus 
conclude that the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers is inversely related to 
institutional ownership changes. Jenter and Kanaan (2006) hold that CEOs are more 
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likely to be dismissed after their firms underperform most of the other firms in the 
same industry. 
2.2 The impact of CEO turnover on firm performance 
Studies show that changes happen on firm performance if any turnover event 
takes place. Furtado and Rozeff (1987) suggest that stock prices and shareholder 
wealth tend to rise following forced CEO dismissals. Moreover, Borokhovich, Parrino, 
and Trapani (1996) find a significant positive abnormal performance when an outsider 
succeeds the CEO. Denis and Denis (1995) examine changes in operating 
performance around top management turnover using 908 non-takeover events. They 
find that firms’ operating performance significantly declines before the events and 
that it increases afterwards. However, the cumulative market-adjusted return is 
negative prior to the turnover, and not significantly different from zero in the 
subsequent year, which is inconsistent with their hypothesis. They explain this finding 
with the confounding negative information of the management dismissal news. In 
addition, they mention a significant corporate downsizing in total assets, employment, 
and capital expenditures following the turnover events. Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino 
(2004) look at both stock performance and operating performance changes around 
turnover events. Their results suggest a deteriorative operating performance preceding 
turnovers, and a significant managerial quality improvement following turnovers. 
When examining stock performance, they use a calendar-time portfolio method to 
explore long-run firm performance, and find a positive average announcement-period 
abnormal return for their 1,302 sample firms. Perez-Gonzalez (2006) demonstrates 
that both in the short-term and long-term, family successions are associated with 
insignificant abnormal returns, while unrelated successions cause positive abnormal 
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returns. Similarly, Adams and Mansi (2009) report a positive cumulative abnormal 
stock return in a (-1, 1) 3-day event window around turnover announcements. 
Dedman and Lin (2002) show contrary evidence in the UK market which suggests 
that the stock market reaction to a turnover announcement is negative if top 
managements are forced to leave and get new jobs in other companies. 
2.3 Differences between forced and voluntary turnovers 
Much of the academic literature that studies on top management turnover 
differentiates forced turnovers from voluntary turnovers. Reasons such as poor 
performance, conflict, and financial wrongdoing would be classified as forced 
turnover causes, while reasons like pursuit of other interests, normal retirement, and 
illness would be regarded as voluntary turnovers reasons (Denis and Denis, 1995). 
Most prior studies find that, abnormal returns following forced turnovers are 
significantly higher than those following voluntary turnovers (Furtado and Rozeff, 
1987; Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani, 1996; Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino, 2004; 
Adams and Mansi, 2009). Moreover, changes in operating firm performance around 
forced turnovers are greater than those around voluntary turnovers (Denis and Denis, 
1995; Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino, 2004). Our paper focuses on turnovers over 
conflicts between board and CEO, thus we expect to find a significant change in both 
abnormal stock return and operating performance around CEO turnover events. 
2.4 Board characteristics and firm performance 
A firm’s board of directors plays an important role in determining the direction 
of the firm when selecting a new executive officer (Vancil, 1987; Weisbach, 1988; 
Lorsch and Maciver, 1989). Studies show that independent boards are more likely to 
initiate needed CEO turnover and management replacements in order to give 
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stockholders a higher reward. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors 
have incentives to act in shareholder interests as they are decision experts from other 
firms. Weisbach (1988) note that after controlling for size, ownership, and industry 
effects, CEOs are more likely to be removed for poor performance in companies with 
outsider-dominated boards than in companies with insider-dominated boards. 
Weisbash argues that inside directors have a closer relationship with CEOs with 
respect to their career path, thus they are unwilling to remove incumbent CEOs. 
Weisbach further shows that the presence of outsider-dominated boards tends to 
increase firm value around CEO resignations, while insider-dominated boards do not 
have that effect. Moreover, Farrell and Whidbee (2000) demonstrate that outside 
directors are rewarded when they remove a poorly performing CEO and bring in a 
CEO that improves firm performance. On a related note, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) 
find that given poor firm performance, the probability of management turnover is 
positively associated with board ownership and board independence. On the contrary, 
Lorsch and Maciver (1989) argue that not all outside directors are necessarily acting 
in the shareholders’ interest, because in the board nomination process, CEOs may 
recommend outside directors who will support their decisions. Westphal and Zajac 
(1995) provide evidence that if incumbent CEOs are more powerful than the boards, 
new directors tend to be demographically similar to the CEOs; if the CEOs are less 
powerful, new directors resemble the existing board. 
Once a CEO turnover takes place, firms with different board structures perform 
differently. Shen and Cannella (2003) suggest that the market reacts positively to the 
promotion of an already-identified CEO successor if the board is outsider-dominated. 
Borokhovich et al. (2006) find evidence that with more outside directors, boards are 
more likely to make improvements in management when a sudden CEO turnover 
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happens. Combs et al. (2007) find that CEO power moderates the relationship 
between board composition and firm performance. Specifically, the relationship 
between board independence and abnormal stock returns following CEO turnovers is 
more negative if CEOs have greater ownership or when CEOs also serve as chairmen. 
He concludes that shareholders welcome the dismissal of high-power CEOs when 
boards are insider-dominated and low-power CEOs when boards are 
outsider-dominated. 
In addition to board independence, board size can also influence board 
efficiency. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that boards with more directors are 
better able to monitor management, but are slower in making decisions. Jensen (1993) 
finds a negative correlation between firm value and the size of a firm’s board of 
directors. Eisenberg et al. (1998) report a negative relationship between board size 
and firm profitability in small firms. 
Some papers focus on the joint position of CEO and board chairman. If the CEO 
is also the chairman of the board, the board’s decision may partially reflect the CEO’s 
intention (Jensen, 1993). Brickley et al. (1997) show that shareholders and regulators 
advocate separating the chairman-CEO positions because that will reduce agency 
costs and improve firm performance. Nevertheless, the separation has potential costs, 
such as the agency costs of controlling the behavior of an independent chairman, the 
information costs of transferring important information between the CEO and 
chairman, and the costs of changing the succession process. Their evidence suggests 
that firm performance will be better if the roles of chairman and CEO are combined, 
and the announcement of the combination does not significantly affect shareholder 
wealth. Given that the costs of separation are larger than the benefits, Brickley et al. 
(1997) conclude that a unitary leadership structure is efficient and consistent with 
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shareholder interests in most large firms. Goyal and Park (2002) show that CEO 
turnovers are less sensitive to firm performance in firms in which the CEO also chairs 
the board, because the board will have difficulties removing poorly performing 
managers due to the lack of independence. 
2.5 CEO characteristics and firm performance 
As a CEO is the key person of a firm’s management team, his or her quality and 
decisions may influence firm performance. Many previous studies have tested the 
relationship between CEO characteristics and firm performance, some of those studies 
focus on executive compensation. Murphy (1985) looks at 500 executives from 73 of 
the largest U.S. publicly held firms for the period between 1964 and 1981. Using 
abnormal stock returns and firm sales growth as measurements of firm performance, 
he finds that firm performance is significantly positively related to executive 
compensation. Abowd (1990) argues that the sensitivity of managerial compensation 
to corporate performance in one year is positively related to corporate performance in 
the next year, suggesting that increasing the performance sensitivity of compensation 
can lead to better performance in the following year. The evidence is weak for 
accounting-based performance, but strong with respect to stock market performance. 
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) report that CEOs earn greater compensation 
when governance structures are less effective, and firms with greater agency problems 
perform worse. They use CEO-chairman duality, board size, percentage of outside 
directors on the board, CEO ownership, and blockholder ownership to predict CEO 
compensation. Their results show that the predicted compensation is negatively 
related to subsequent operating and stock market performance. 
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Outside CEO successions result in different consequences than inside 
successions in term of a firm’s direction and performance. Outsiders are almost 
always hired to change the direction of a firm (Parrino, 1997). Helmich (1974) 
suggests that firms grow more rapidly following outsider replacements. Cannella and 
Lubatkin (1993) find that accounting returns are negatively related to the likelihood of 
outside succession. Huson et al. (2004) argue that firm performance changes as 
turnover events occur and note that the degree of performance improvement is 
positively related to the appointment of an outsider CEO. 
Our study adds to these strands of the corporate governance literature by 
investigating the impact of conflict-induced CEO turnovers on firm performance. 
CEOs sometimes resign for personal reasons or wrongdoing, but it has not been 
proved that whether the resignation is because of their personal issues or poor 
performance in cases that they resign for conflicts with the boards. The firms in our 
sample have been publicly announced that CEOs resigned for policy differences with 
the boards. We suppose that there are some hidden reasons that the board dismisses a 
CEO, such as the board want to lead the firm to a new industry and conduct a business 
expansion. Thus, we examine possible causes that may lead to disagreements between 
boards and CEOs, such as poor performance and change in direction of the firms. In 
addition, we examine whether changes in firm performance can be explained by board 
and CEO characteristics, and whether firms with certain characteristics perform better 
after a conflict-induced turnover. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first 






Our study focuses on a sample of forced CEO turnovers which results from 
disagreements between boards and CEOs during the period from January 1995 to 
December 2007. 
We classify a turnover as a forced turnover if corresponding announcement in 
the Dow Jones Inc. Factiva publications library reports that the CEO has been fired, 
forced from the position, or departed due to unspecified policy differences. Further, 
we identify forced turnovers if the CEO resigned over differences with the company 
board, or the CEO resigned because of fundamental differences over the direction of 
the company. 
We initially obtain a sample of 156 forced CEO turnover events. After 
excluding firms without proxy statements in the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Edgar database, our sample consists of 80 firms with forced CEO 
turnovers. 
In order to examine board and CEO characteristics, we manually collect 
information on outside board, board size, CEO age, CEO tenure, compensation and 
ownership from SEC proxy statements. Board members who do not hold any 
management positions are regarded as outside board members and we defining 
variable ‘outside directors’ that represents the proportion of the number of outside 
directors on the board. We also collect additional the CEO information from the 
Execucomp database. In addition, we differentiate between insiders and outsiders new 
CEOs. New CEOs who have been with their firms for less than one year are classified 
as outsiders; all others are classified as insiders. 
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We consider an event period that lasts from three years before announcement 
year to three years after announcement year. For this seven-year period, we employ 
operating return on assets (OROA) and stock return as two measures of firm 
performance. Information on accounting measures is obtained from Standard & 
Poor’s Compustat files. Specifically, we collect variables including operating income 
before depreciation (Compustat item 13), total asset (Compustat item 6), net income 
(Compustat item 172), common equity (Compustat item 235), fiscal year close price 
(Compustat item 199), common shares outstanding (Compustat item 25), and capital 
expenditures (Compustat item 128). Based on these, we calculate OROA, return on 
assets, and book-to-market ratios. To control for industry effects, we adjust the 
accounting measures by subtracting the median value of the data of all firms in the 
same industry. We classify industries using the Fama French industry classification, 
system that differentiates between 49 industry sectors can be found on Kenneth 
R. French’s Data Library website.1 To examine changes in the number of geographic 
segments, we collect firms’ historical segments data from Compustat database. 
We collect stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and Thomson Reuters’ Datastream database. Specifically, we download daily 
and monthly stock returns from CRSP, and then complement the seven-year period 
dataset using data from Datastream. As Datastream only provides the total return 
index (RI), we calculate a firm’s stock return as:        =
   
     
  . We also obtain 
the equally-weighted, value-weighted, and S&P composite index return from CRSP, 
which we employ for our event study analysis. 





To examine turnover effects more explicitly, we construct a control group 
which consists of 75 one-to-one matched firms that have no CEO turnover event 
during our seven-year sample period. We matched each of the sample firms on the 
basis of total assets, market value, and return on assets using the following criteria: (1) 
the matching firm is in the same Fama-French industry with the sample firm, (2) the 
matching firm does not experience any turnover events during the seven-year event 
period, (3) information of the matching firm is available in Compustat and CRSP for 
the same fiscal years as the sample firms, and (4) the matching firm earns the closest 
score as the sample firm as the result of a propensity score matching process. We use 
data for the one year preceding the forced turnover to run the matching process. We 
exclude two sample firms that do not have available data during the year preceding 
the turnover, one sample firm that does not have any available data on Compustat and 
CRSP, and two sample firms that have missing market value data. Thus, our 
comparison sample consists of 75 matching firms. 
 
4. Methodology 
To examine changes in operating performance around CEO turnovers, we use 
operating return on assets (OROA) as the measure. OROA is calculated as: 
                              
       
    
                       (1) 
where         is the operating income before depreciation of firm i in year t and 
     are the total assets of firm i in year t. 
The change in OROA of year a to year b is calculated as: 
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                                             (2) 
We use event study methodology to measure the short-term impact of CEO 
turnover announcements on a firm’s stock performance. The model we use to predict 
expected returns is the market model: 
                                                         (3) 
where     and     are the returns on security i and the market portfolio on day t, 
and     is the error term. For each firm i, the abnormal return is calculated as the 
difference between the actual return (        ) and the expected return (   ) on day t: 
                                                          (4) 
To ensure the robustness of our results with respect to the market index we use 
in our market model, we calculate abnormal stock returns by using the CRSP equally 
weighted index, the CRSP value weighted index, and the S&P 500 index as the 
market portfolio, respectively, and thus report three sets of results. 
We are interested in the time series effect of abnormal return, because some of 
the abnormal return behavior show up in the pre-event period, and post-event returns 
provides information on market efficiency (Kothari and Warner, 2006). Thus we 
consider each firm’s cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the turnover event 
to examine the firm’s stock performance over a short period, which is the sum of each 
day’s average abnormal return performance. The CAR starting at time    through 
time    is calculated as: 
                                   
  
    
                    (5) 
For long-run abnormal returns, buy-and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) has 
been widely used in the recent years, which are defined as the differences between the 
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long-run returns of sample firms and those of benchmark firms selected to capture 
expected return. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) describe the BHAR as “the average 
multiyear return from a strategy of investing in all firms that complete an event and 
selling at the end of a pre-specified holding period versus a comparable strategy using 
otherwise similar nonevent firms”. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) 
suggest that BHARs measure the long-run investor experience, and they can capture 
the investor’s experience from buying and holding securities for 3 to 5 years. Barber 
and Lyon (1997) also show that CAR is a biased predictor of BHAR, the difference of 
BHAR and CAR is due to compounding. 
Following the literature, we examine the long-term abnormal stock performance 
by computing BHAR for our sample firms
2
. Specifically, we calculate BHAR using 
equally weighted market return, value weighted market return, and return of matching 
sample as the benchmark return, respectively. The BHAR for firm i from time period 
a to b is calculated as: 
                        
 
                    
 
             (6) 
where      refers to the monthly return of firm i in month t, and              is the 
return on benchmark in month t. We examine returns during the event month and for a 
one year period afterwards. The mean buy-and-hold abnormal return is calculated as 
the equally weighted average of the individual BHARs: 
                                  
 
 
      
 
                       (7) 
where n is the number of sample firms. 
                                                          
2
 We don’t use calendar-time portfolio approach because Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that this approach 
tends to find results that consistent with market efficiency, and under-weights managers’ timing decisions when 
estimating abnormal returns.  
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In order to examine whether successor CEO and board characteristics have an 
influence on a firm’s post-event performance, we estimate a multivariate regression 
model that explores the determinants of firm performance changes following CEO 
turnovers. The models are specified as follows: 
                                                   
                                             
                                    
                                         
                                 
                                                            (8) 
                                                  
                                             
                                         
                                                     
                                                            (9) 
We use buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) as a measure of stock 
performance, and changes in operating return on assets (COROA) as a measure of 
operating performance. With respect to our independent variables,              is 
the dollar value of a CEO’s salary and bonus,              is the percentage of 
shares owned by the CEO,     is the successor CEO’s age,            is a 
dummy variable which equals one if the successor CEO is promoted from within the 
firm and zero if the successor CEO is an outsider,             is a dummy 
variable which equals one if the CEO also serves as chairman and zero if the CEO is 
not in the chairman position,           is the number of directors sitting on the 
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board,                  is the percentage of outside directors on the board, 
                is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm increases its 
number of geographic segments and zero if the number of segments does not change, 
                is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm decreases its 
number of geographic segments and zero if the number of segments does not change, 
         is a dummy variable which equals one if a subsequent turnover event 
occurs within three years following the forced turnover and zero otherwise, and 
         is the firm’s size, calculated as the natural logarithm of the total assets. 
Compensation, ownership, age, insider appointment, and chairman duality are 
CEO characteristics while compensation, ownership, and chairman duality are also 
measures of CEO power (Finkelstein, 1992; Daily and Johnson, 1997). Board size and 
outside board membership are characteristics of the board, and          is used to 
control for firm size effects. We also use one year            as a control 
variable of BHAR, to test whether former returns have effect on current returns. We 
add two segment dummies because we expect that a change in the number of 
geographic segments indicates that the firm is expanding or reducing its business 
geographically, which may result in changes in overall firm performance. Finally, we 
include a subsequent turnover dummy because there are 23 out of our 80 sample firms 
that initiate a second or a third turnover within three years following our sample 
events
3
. We hypothesize that subsequent turnover events suggest that the initial 
turnover may be of an interim nature or that the firm may be facing more serious 
performance troubles or disagreements on the board of directors
4
. 
                                                          
3
 Eight of these 23 firms appoint an outsider as successor and the rest 15 firms appoint an insider as successor. 
4 We also run regressions by including some other instrument variables and year dummy variables and find that 
the results have no difference with the current regression in terms of significance. 
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5. Empirical results 
5.1 Sample characteristics 
Table 1 describes sample frequencies of CEO turnover years. CEO turnover 
occurred most frequently in 2002 and less frequently in 1995, 1996, and 2007. Table 
2 reports sample frequencies of industries. In our sample, firms in computer software 
and retail industry are most frequently experience CEO turnovers. Table 2 shows that 
12.5% of the firms are in computer software industry and 13.75% of the firms are in 
retail industry. 
Table 3 provides information on CEO and board characteristics for a number of 
sub-periods prior to and after a turnover. Panel A and Panel B provide summary 
statistics on CEO characteristics around turnover events. Outgoing CEOs have a 
median age of 48 and the age ranges from 26 to 63. The median age of incoming 
CEOs is 53, i.e. 5 years older than that of outgoing CEOs. We observe that firms with 
forced CEO turnovers employ older CEOs to replace the dismissed CEOs. Outgoing 
CEOs stayed with the firm for a median of 7.84 years, 16% of them are founders of 
their company. Fifty six percent of incoming CEOs are outsiders, suggesting that the 
proportion of outside appointments is larger than that of inside appointments. Forty 
nine percent of the outgoing CEOs hold a dual position of CEO and chairman, while 
only 34% of the incoming CEOs hold a dual position, indicating that firms tend to 
separate the chairman and CEO leadership positions after they change a CEO. When 
examining CEO compensation, we find that in most cases the compensation of 
incoming CEOs is close to the compensation of outgoing CEOs. Panel C and Panel D 
provide information on board characteristics around CEO turnovers. On average, 
there are eight directors who sit on the board and the board size does not experience 
19 
 
any changes around the events. The median percentage of outside directors is 80 for 
firms in the pre-event period, while it increases to 85.71 in the post-event period, 
suggesting that boards are more outsider-dominated after CEO turnover events. With 
respect to ownership, incoming CEOs own a smaller percentage of shares than 
outgoing CEOs, insiders own a lower percentage in the post-event period than in the 
pre-event period, and post-event institutional ownership is smaller in terms of means 
and larger in terms of medians than pre-event institutional ownership. 
Table 4 reports firm characteristics around CEO turnover events. Panel A and 
Panel B provide information for 79 sample firms while Panel C and Panel D provide 
information for 75 matched firms. For our sample firms, the median OROA is 0.09 
during both the pre-event and the post-event periods. The median total assets are 
$448.44 million before turnovers and $353.42 million after turnovers. The median 
capital expenditures are $14.36 million before turnovers and $7.95 million after 
turnovers. The median book-to-market ratio is 0.43 before turnovers and 0.53 after 
turnovers. The median return on assets does not change around turnovers. For 
matched firms, the median OROA, the median book-to-market ratio, and the median 
ROA are similar between the pre- and post-event period, while the median of total 
assets and capital expenditures is larger in the post-event period than in the pre-event 
period. To compare sample firms with matched firms, we examine differences in 
median values during the same period. In the pre-event period, the median OROA, 
total assets, and book-to-market ratio are similar between the sample group and the 
matched group, the median capital expenditures of the sample group are $4.25 million 
larger than those of the matched group, and the median ROA of the sample group is 
slightly smaller than that of the matched group. In the post-event period, the median 
of OROA, the book-to-market ratio, and the ROA of the two groups are close, while 
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the median of total assets and capital expenditures of matched firms are larger than 
those of sample firms. The median total assets of sample firms are $353.42 million, 
and that of matched firms are $893.77 million. The data show that sample firms’ total 
assets and capital expenditures decrease after the turnovers while those of matched 
firms increase, suggesting that sample firms are downsized after CEO turnovers. 
Table 5 provides Pearson correlation coefficients correlations between our 
variables. Firm size is positively correlated with compensation, board size, and the 
percentage of outside directors on the board, possibly because large firms require 
CEOs with higher quality and board with more directors who can provide monitoring 
services. Other variables are not highly correlated. 
5.2 Changes in operating performance around forced CEO turnovers 
Figures 1 to 3 display time series patterns in the operating return on assets for 
our sample firms. The figures depict the median unadjusted OROA changes, the 
median industry-adjusted OROA changes, and the matched group-adjusted OROA 
changes. The graphs suggest that operating performance of the sample firms 
deteriorates before the CEO turnover event, reaches a low point at the turnover 
announcement year, and recovers afterwards. Figure 4 depicts the median unadjusted 
OROA changes of no multiple turnover firms and multiple turnover firms. The graph 
suggests that firms with no multiple turnovers outperform firms with multiple 
turnovers. Figure 5 displays the median operating performance change of insider 
succession firms and outsider succession firms. The graph suggests that firms with 
insider successions outperform firms with outsider successions. 
Following Denis and Denis (1995) and Huson et al. (2004), we examine 
changes in operating return on assets during the year prior to the turnover event (year 
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-1) as well as the changes from year -3 to year -1, year -1 to year 1, and year -1 to 
year 3 etc. The results, provided in Table 6, suggest that the median change in the 
matched firm-adjusted OROA for year -1 to year 1 is positively significant at the 0.1 
level, and that both the mean and median changes in industry-adjusted OROA for 
years -1 to 2 are positively significant at the 0.1 level. Changes from year -3 to year -1 
and year -1 to year 3 are not significant. 
To compare the operating performance during the pre-event and post-event 
period, we examine changes around year 0. The results, provided in Table 7, show 
that the unadjusted median OROA change is negatively significant in the period from 
year -3 to year 0, all median changes are positively significant in the period from year 
0 to year 1, mean and median industry-adjusted OROA changes are positively 
significant in the period from year 0 to year 2, and the median matched 
group-adjusted OROA change is positively significant in the period from year 0 to 
year 3. We also find that the median industry-adjusted OROA in the period from year 
0 to year 2 is 0.0204, which is larger than that of year 0 to year 1. The median 
matched group-adjusted OROA in the period from year 0 to year 3 is 0.0348, which is 
larger than the value of 0.02 in the period from year 0 to year 1. The results confirm 
that the operating performance of firms with forced CEO turnovers decreases before 
turnover events, and improves after the new CEOs takes charge. 
5.3 Changes in total assets, capital expenditures, return on assets, and 
book-to-market ratio around forced CEO turnovers 
Table 8 reports median percentage changes in the book value of total assets, 
capital expenditures, return on assets, and book-to-market ratios in year -1 while 
Table 9 reports changes in year 0. Denis and Denis (1995) review a series of prior 
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studies in this area that document a tendency for firms to engage in corporate 
downsizing following organizational changes. In their own paper, they find mixed 
evidence of corporate restructuring following turnovers. Huson et al. (2004) argue 
that examining restructuring activities would help understand the sources of 
improvements in OROA because increases in OROA may be a result of reducing 
capital intensity, eliminating poorly performing businesses, or writing down the book 
values of assets. Panel A of Table 8 shows that median total assets significantly 
increase by 15.61 percent from year -3 to year -1, and decrease by 7.41 percent from 
year -1 to year 1. The changes in total assets during year 2 and year 3 are not 
significantly different from zero. Median capital expenditures increase by 12.28 
percent from year -3 to year -1. In Panel A and Panel B of Table 9 we can observe 
that median total assets increase by 9.48 percent before turnover events and that 
median capital expenditures decrease by 10.6 percent from year 0 to year 1. The 
results provide significant evidence of upsizing before turnovers and weak evidence 
of downsizing after turnovers. 
Panels C and D of Tables 8 and 9 report changes in the return on assets (ROA) 
and book-to-market ratios. Aside from OROA, ROA can be used as a measure of firm 
performance as it captures the return that shareholders receive relative to total assets, 
while market-to-book ratios can be used as a forward-looking measure of 
performance (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006). As shown in Tables 8 and 9, the median return 
on assets decreases throughout our sample period, while changes in the median 
book-to-market ratio are mostly insignificant. 
5.4 Changes in the number of geographic segments 
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Table 10 shows mean changes in the number of geographic segments. The 
average number of geographic segments increases by 0.16 from year -1 to year 0 
(significant at the 0.1 level), and then increase by 0.22 from year 0 to year 1 
(significant at the 0.05 level), while the changes are insignificantly different from zero 
for other periods. This suggests that firms expand their business to more countries 
around turnovers. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the board and 
the CEO have disagreements on the business expansions, and then the board replaces 
the former CEO with someone that will support their business decisions.  
We also explore whether firms change their industry focus in connection with a 
CEO turnovers, but find evidence of industry changes for only two firms. We suggest 
that in our sample, change industry in not the general case that causes the boards to 
dismiss the CEOs. 
5.5 Changes in stock performance around forced CEO turnovers 
5.5.1 Short-term abnormal stock returns around CEO turnovers 
Daily abnormal returns are calculated based on daily return data for a (-230, -30) 
estimation period and a (-30, 30) event window. Figures 4 to 6 depict trends in 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around CEO turnovers by using equally 
weighted market index returns, value weighted market index returns and S&P 500 
index returns as the market portfolio, respectively. The time series patterns in CARs 
in the three models are similar to each other. The figures show that CARs from day 
-30 to day -1 varies in a small range, while they experience a sharp decline following 
turnover announcement day and reach a low point on day 4. Afterwards, CARs keep 
increasing until the end of our event window. We suggest that investors perceive 
conflict-induced turnovers as a negative signal possibly because they are concerned 
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about the internal turmoil associated with a forced turnover, but buy back into the 
firm once the firm resolves those problems. 
5.5.2 Long-term abnormal stock returns around CEO turnovers 
Table 11 reports the mean long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). 
Panels A, B, and C show that our sample firms experience significant negative 
abnormal returns in year -1 and year 1, and insignificant BHARs in the remaining 
years. In Panel A, the BHAR in year -1 is -35.33% and the BHAR in year 1 is 
-20.06%. In Panel B, the BHAR in year -1 is -32.95 and the BHAR in year 1 is 
-15.64%. This suggest that boards may decide to fire CEOs in reaction to poor stock 
price performance and that investors observe internal disagreements in the firm and 
thus reduce their demand for the firm’s stock. We also note that 80.77% of the sample 
firm stocks underperform relative to the equally weighted market index and 76.92% 
underperform relative to the value weighted market index in year -1. In the first year 
following turnovers, the average abnormal returns are still negative, but only 68.83% 
and 63.64% of the sample firm stocks underperform relative to the equally weighted 
market index and the value weighted market index, respectively. In subsequent years 
after year 1, the proportion of sample firm stocks that underperform the market 
continues to decline. In Panel C, the BHAR in year -1 and 1 are negative, with fewer 
firms underperforming matched firms over time. In year -3, year -2, year 2, and year 3, 
abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero, and only 50% to 66% of 
the sample firms underperform the market index or matched firms, suggesting that the 
underperformance is concentrated in year -1 and year 1. 
Figure 9 and 10 display BHARs changes of subsamples. Figure 9 provides 
information on BHARs of no multiple turnover firms and multiple turnover firms. This 
graph shows a fluctuating pattern of abnormal returns of both firms with no multiple 
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turnovers and firms with multiple turnovers. Figure 10 shows that firms with insider 
successions outperform firms with outsider successions in year -3, year 2, and year 3, while 
they have similar stock performance in year -2, year -1, and year 1. 
5.6 Regression analysis of post-turnover firm performance 
We run regressions with panel data and estimate them using a fixed effect 
model based on a Hausman specification test. The dependent variables are the 
BHARs and OROA changes during years 1 to 3. The regression results are reported in 
Table 12. The results for the equally-adjusted BHARs model, value-adjusted BHARs 
model, and match-adjusted BHARs model are very similar. The regression results 
suggest that CEO and board characteristics are not significantly related to abnormal 
stock returns. We find that BHARs are negatively related to the turnover dummy and 
positively related to firm size, with coefficients of -0.693 and 1.431, respectively. The 
dummy that identifies subsequent turnovers within three years following a sample 
turnover event is negatively related to the firm’s stock performance, possibly because 
these firms experience bigger corporate governance problems than other firms. We 
also find that BHARs are negatively related to lagged BHAR, suggesting that former 
abnormal stock returns have reverting effect on current abnormal stock returns. 
Table 12 also provides regression results for models that use changes in OROA 
as a dependent variable. CEO ownership is positively related to unadjusted OROA 
changes while firm size is negatively related to unadjusted OROA changes. 
Industry-adjusted OROA changes are only negatively related to firm size. Matched 
group-adjusted OROA changes are negatively related to CEO ownership. We find 
very little evidence to support that CEO characteristics are related to firm’s operating 
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performance changes, and no evidence to support the notion that board characteristics 
affect firms’ operating performance changes. 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
This paper considers firms that experienced a conflict-induced forced CEO 
turnover and examines characteristics of the boards and CEOs in these firms. In 
addition, we examine firm performance changes around turnover events and explore 
what factors influence the post-turnover firm performance. We present evidence that 
suggest that successor CEOs are older than outgoing CEOs, that a majority of them 
are appointed from the outside, that fewer of them hold a dual position of CEO and 
chairman. In addition, boards tend to be more outsider-dominated after the turnover 
than before it. 
In terms of firm performance, we examining changes in OROA around the 
event year, and show that operating performance deteriorates prior to forced turnover 
events and improves after the turnovers. This finding is consistent with previous 
studies which find significant declining and improving operating performance around 
forced top management dismissals (Denis and Denis, 1995; Huson, Malatesta, and 
Parrino, 2004). In addition, we find moderate evidence that firms downsize their 
operations following CEO turnovers and significant evidence of declining ROAs. 
Interestingly, we find a significant increase in the number of firms’ geographic 
segments in the years (-1, 0) and (0, 1). We conjecture that boards fire CEOs if there 
is disagreement about business expansion and replace them with someone who will 
support their decisions. The relationship between business expansions and the 
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probability of forced CEO turnovers remains an interesting question for future 
research. When we analyze firms’ stock performance we find that in the short-term, 
abnormal returns are declining in the first four days following the announcement, and 
increasing thereafter. In the long-term, abnormal returns are significantly negative in 
year -1 and year 1, but not significantly different from zero in other periods. This 
suggests that forced CEO turnovers resulting from disagreements between the board 
and the CEO are not a positive signal for investors during the first four days and the 
first year. 
We also examine whether boards and CEOs with certain characteristics would 
lead to a better post-turnover firm performance. The regression results do not present 
any evidence that board characteristics, CEO characteristics and firm performance 
have a significant relationship. However, long-term abnormal stock returns are 
negatively associated with the occurrence of subsequent CEO turnovers, suggesting 
that CEO turnovers do have negative influence on stock returns in certain instances. 
We also find that firm size is positively related to stock performance and negatively 
related to operating performance. 
In our sample, 23 out of 80 firms initiate multiple turnovers within three years 
and those subsequent turnovers generate negative effect on firm performance. Based 
on the large proportion of firms that experience multiple turnovers, we suggest that 
boards may exert too much pressure on CEOs, thus many successor CEOs are not 
willing to work with the current boards. Investors may also perceive the conflicts as 
the boards’ problems, thus stock price falls when a second and a third turnover takes 
place. 
This study is conducted with 80 turnover events that happened in the January 
1995 to December 2008 period related to conflict-induced CEO turnover. The sample 
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size remains a limitation of our study. It will be useful to explore this relationship 
further using a larger sample in future research. In addition, future study can examine 
whether business expansion is the reason that cause the conflicts between boards and 
CEOs, and whether they are associated with a higher probability of CEO turnovers. 
Moreover, our study contains several interesting phenomenon. For example, some 
original CEOs resigned within three years preceding the forced turnover and then the 
second CEO succeeds. When the second CEO was fired because of policy differences 
with the board, the original CEO was reinstated in the CEO position again. It is 
interesting for future research to look at the performance issues of the firms which 

















Table 1: Description of turnover years 
This table reports sample frequencies of years of CEO turnovers. The sample consists of 80 
forced CEO turnover events occurred between January 1995 and December 2007. 
Year Number of firms % of sample 
1995 3 3.75 
1996 2 2.50 
1997 9 11.25 
1998 9 11.25 
1999 9 11.25 
2000 8 10.00 
2001 4 5.00 
2002 12 15.00 
2003 5 6.25 
2004 4 5.00 
2005 8 10.00 
2006 4 5.00 





























Table 2: Description of turnover firms’ industries 
This table reports sample frequencies of industries of CEO turnover firms. The sample 
consists of 80 forced CEO turnover events occurred between January 1995 and December 
2007. Industries are classified using criteria of the Fama French 49 industry classification. 
Industry No. Industry Number of firms % of sample 
2 Food Products 1 1.25 
7 Entertainment 1 1.25 
8 Printing and Publishing 1 1.25 
9 Consumer Goods 3 3.75 
10 Apparel 2 2.50 
11 Healthcare 3 3.75 
12 Medical Equipment 4 5.00 
13 Pharmaceutical Products 6 7.50 
14 Chemicals 2 2.50 
18 Construction 1 1.25 
31 Utilities 2 2.50 
32 Communication 2 2.50 
33 Personal Services 1 1.25 
34 Business Services 8 10.00 
35 Computer Hardware 6 7.50 
36 Computer Software 10 12.50 
37 Electronic Equipment 3 3.75 
38 Measuring and Control Equipment 1 1.25 
42 Wholesale 1 1.25 
43 Retail 11 13.75 
44 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 4 5.00 
45 Banking 3 3.75 
46 Insurance 2 2.50 
48 Trading 1 1.25 






Table 3: Summary statistics of CEO and board characteristics 
This table reports statistics for a sample of 80 forced CEO turnover events occurred between January 1995 and December 2007. For each firm, we collect 
information from three years before through three years after the turnover year. CEO-Chairman equals one if the CEO also serves as chairman of the board, 
and zero otherwise. Founder CEO equals one if the outgoing CEO is the founder of the firm, and zero otherwise. Years with the firm is positive if the 
incoming CEO is an insider, and zero if he/she is an outsider. Outsider CEO equals one if the incoming CEO has not been employed by the firm before the 
turnover, and zero otherwise. Outside directors are directors who are not affiliated with the firm. CEO ownership is the percentage of common stock 
ownership held by the CEO. Insider ownership is the percentage of common stock ownership of officers and directors. Institutional ownership is the 
ownership of institutions who own beneficially more than five percent of any class of the company's voting securities. 
 
Mean Minimum Median Maximum Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Outgoing CEO Characteristics 
     
Age (in years) 47.61 26.00 48.00 63.00 7.00 
Years with firm (in years) 9.82 1.17 7.84 37.00 7.47 
CEO tenure (in years) 7.94 1.17 6.50 25.58 5.32 
Founder CEO 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.37 
CEO-Chairman 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
Salary (in US$ thousands) 484.44 0.00 378.53 3,961.17 453.59 
Bonus (in US$ thousands) 342.10 0.00 34.45 12,421.35 1,085.41 
Total compensation (in US$ thousands) 6,481.30 45.41 1,268.54 139,718.69 16,401.14 
      
Panel B: Incoming CEO Characteristics 
     
Age (in years) 53.70 37.00 53.00 72.00 7.77 
Years with firm when appointed as CEO  
(in years) 
4.14 0.00 0.75 34.00 6.30 
Outsider CEO 0.56 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
CEO-Chairman 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 
Salary (in US$ thousands) 453.49 0.00 351.48 1,500.00 366.32 
Bonus (in US$ thousands) 432.17 0.00 50.00 8,624.00 988.42 
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Total compensation (in US$ thousands) 4,556.54 0.00 1,164.52 49,014.24 8,461.31 
 
     Panel C: Board characteristics before the turnover 
    
Board size 8.36 4.00 8.00 16.00 2.44 
Outside directors (%) 76.70 45.24 80.00 92.31 11.80 
CEO ownership (%) 4.86 0.00 1.79 37.70 7.83 
Insider ownership (%) 18.71 0.45 13.30 62.01 17.24 
Institutional ownership (%) 32.33 0.00 27.37 88.87 22.56 
      
Panel D: Board characteristics after the turnover 
    
Board size 8.47 4.00 8.00 15.00 2.42 
Outside directors (%) 81.74 35.00 85.71 92.30 10.27 
CEO ownership (%) 4.16 0.00 0.97 70.67 10.99 
Insider ownership (%) 15.30 0.00 9.20 66.22 22.56 
















Table 4: Summary statistics of firm characteristics 
This table reports statistics for a sample of 79 firms with forced CEO turnover events and a sample of 75 firms with no CEO turnover event occurred between 
January 1995 and December 2007. For each firm, we collect information from three years before through three years after the turnover year. OROA is 
operating return on assets, calculated as operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of a firm’s book value 
of equity and market value. ROA is return on assets, calculated as net income divided by total assets. 
 
Mean Minimum Median Maximum Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Sample firms before turnover 
    
OROA -0.12 -23.83 0.09 0.28 1.72 
Total assets (in US$ millions) 4,165.55 0.04 448.44 76,138.00 10,678.46 
Capital expenditures (in US$ millions) 176.04 0.00 14.36 3,173.00 430.39 
Book-to-market ratio 0.44 -6.44 0.43 1.75 0.64 
ROA -0.26 -23.91 0.01 0.28 1.78 
      
Panel B: Sample firms after turnover 
    
OROA 0.00 -2.58 0.09 0.45 0.29 
Total assets (in US$ millions) 4,820.79 0.95 353.42 113,331.00 13,701.95 
Capital expenditures (in US$ millions) 151.08 0.00 7.95 3,040.00 421.44 
Book-to-market ratio -1.09 -311.90 0.53 27.49 23.29 
ROA -0.08 -3.14 0.01 0.56 0.33 
      
Panel C: Matched firms before turnover 
    
OROA 0.07 -1.59 0.12 0.46 0.24 
Total assets (in US$ millions) 1,643.55 6.76 437.31 21,309.30 3,272.16 
Capital expenditures (in US$ millions) 122.69 0.00 10.13 6,171.74 497.39 
Book-to-market ratio 0.64 -1.41 0.43 25.63 1.82 
ROA -0.02 -1.71 0.05 0.59 0.27 
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Panel D: Matched firms after turnover 
    
OROA 0.05 -2.53 0.12 0.43 0.32 
Total assets (in US$ millions) 2,930.51 3.43 893.77 27,303.93 5,090.90 
Capital expenditures (in US$ millions) 115.97 0.00 19.79 1,886.01 256.87 
Book-to-market ratio 0.30 -46.53 0.48 10.85 3.85 

























Table 5: Correlations between independent variables 
This table reports correlations between the independent variables. The variables include the CEO’s cash compensation (Compensation), the percentage of 
shares owned by the CEO (CEO ownership), the CEO’s age (Age), a dummy variable that equals to one if the CEO is an insider (Insider CEO), a dummy 
variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board (CEO-Chairman), the number of directors sitting on the board (Board size), the 
percentage of outside directors on the board (Outside directors), the lagged buy-and-hold abnormal return (Lagged BHAR), a dummy variable that equals one 
if the firm increases or decreases its number of geographic segments (Segment), a dummy variable that equals one if a subsequent turnover event occurs 















BHAR Segment Turnover Firm size 
Compensation 1 
          CEO ownership -0.1295 1 
         Age 0.1900 -0.0811 1 
        Insider CEO -0.1522 0.2125 -0.1978 1 
       CEO-Chairman 0.3043* 0.2859* 0.3984* -0.0395 1 
      Board size 0.2960* 0.0615 0.2877* -0.0709 0.3047* 1 
     Outside directors 0.2626* -0.4583* 0.1298 -0.1187 0.0513 0.3947* 1 
    Lagged BHAR 0.0330 -0.0399 0.0843 -0.1162 0.1075 0.0952 0.0013 1 
   Segment -0.0726 0.0238 -0.1859 -0.0062 -0.1292 -0.1996 0.0605 0.0887 1 
  Turnover -0.1703 -0.0810 0.0550 -0.0904 -0.1078 -0.1456 -0.1470 -0.1014 -0.0871 1 
 Firm size 0.6751* -0.2093 0.2752* -0.0676 0.2840* 0.5569* 0.4268* 0.1347 -0.0551 -0.1182 1 




Table 6: Changes in operating return on assets in Year -1 
This table reports mean and median changes in operating return on assets (OROA) for 68 sample firms during the period from January 1995 to December 
2007 period. The sample contains 80 firms originally. When firms with missing data are excluded, there are 68 firms left. The sample period for each firm is 
three years before through three years after the turnover year. Industry-adjusted OROA is adjusted by subtracting the Fama French 49 industry level median 
OROA from the firm’s unadjusted OROA. Matched group-adjusted OROA is adjusted by subtracting matched group median OROA from the matched firm’s 
unadjusted OROA. The significance of mean and median changes is based on a standard two-tailed t-test and a median sign-test.  
Years -3 to 3 
 
-3 to -1 
 
-1 to 1 
 
-1 to 2 
 






































***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively. 
 
Table 7: Changes in operating return on assets in Year 0 
This table reports mean and median changes in operating return on assets (OROA) for 64 sample firms during the period from January 1995 to December 
2007 period. The sample contains 80 firms originally. When firms with missing data are excluded, there are 64 firms left. The sample period for each firm is 
three years before through three years after the turnover year. Industry-adjusted OROA is adjusted by subtracting the Fama French 49 industry level median 
OROA from the firm’s unadjusted OROA. Matched group-adjusted OROA is adjusted by subtracting matched group median OROA from the matched firm’s 
unadjusted OROA. The significance of mean and median changes is based on a standard two-tailed t-test and a median sign-test. 
Years -3 to 0 
 
0 to 1 
 
0 to 2 
 






























***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Median percentage changes in the book value of total assets, capital expenditures, 
return on assets, and book-to-market ratio in Year -1 
This table reports median percentage changes in the book value of total assets, capital 
expenditures, return on assets, and book-to-market ratio for 71 sample firms during the period 
from January 1995 to December 2007. The sample contains 80 firms originally. When firms 
with missing data are excluded, there are 71 firms left. Industry-adjusted values are adjusted 
by subtracting the Fama French 49 industry level median OROA from each firm’s unadjusted 
OROA. The significance of median percentage changes is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-rank test. The null hypothesis of the signed-rank test is that the median 
changes do not differ from zero. 
Years -3 to -1 
 
-1 to 1 
 
-1 to 2 
 
-1 to 3 
Panel A: Book value of total assets 















        
Panel B: Capital expenditures 















        
Panel C: Return on assets 















        
Panel D: Book-to-market ratio 







































Table 9: Median percentage changes in the book value of total assets, capital expenditures, 
return on assets, and book-to-market ratio in Year 0 
This table reports median percentage changes in the book value of total assets, capital 
expenditures, return on assets, and book-to-market ratio for 66 sample firms during the period 
from January 1995 to December 2007. The sample contains 80 firms originally. When firms 
with missing data are excluded, there are 66 firms left. Industry-adjusted values are adjusted 
by subtracting the Fama French 49 industry level median OROA from each firm’s unadjusted 
OROA. The significance of median percentage changes is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-rank test. The null hypothesis of the signed-rank test is that the median 
changes do not differ from zero. 
Years -3 to 0 
 
0 to 1 
 
0 to 2 
 
0 to 3 
Panel A: Book value of total assets 















        
Panel B: Capital expenditures 















        
Panel C: Return on assets 















        
Panel D: Book-to-market ratio 





















Table 10: Mean changes in the number of geographic segments 
This table reports mean changes in the number of geographic segments for 67 sample firms 
during the period from January 1995 to December 2007. Geographic segments represent 
countries that in a firm’s target market. The significance of mean changes is based on a 
standard two-tailed t-test. 
Year -3 to -2 -2 to -1 -1 to 0 0 to 1 1 to 2 2 to 3 
Change in number of 
geographic segments 0.12 -0.08 0.16* 0.22** 0.07 -0.08 
T-statistic -1.53 0.93 -1.93 -2.09 -0.63 0.88 






Table 11: Long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 
This table reports the mean long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for 78 sample firms during the period from January 1995 to December 2007 
in Panel A and Panel B, and 73 firms in Panel C. BHARs are calculated as:                
 
                    
 
    , where      refers to the 
monthly return of firm i in month t, and              is the return on the associated benchmark in month t. For our benchmarks, we use equally weighted 
market returns, value weighted market returns, and returns on the matching sample, respectively. The mean buy-and-hold abnormal return is calculated as the 
equally weighted average of the individual BHARs:              
 
 
      
 
   , where n is the number of sample firms. The significance of mean changes is 
based on a standard two-tailed t-test. 
Year -3 -2 -1 1st 2nd 3rd 
Panel A: Equally weighted market-adjusted returns 
      Sample return 31.15 19.38 -23.45 -5.72 22.97 11.84 
Benchmark return 17.34 17.80 11.89 14.34 12.42 12.74 
Abnormal return 13.81 1.58 -35.33*** -20.06*** 10.55 -0.91 
T-statistic 0.94 0.18 -5.81 -2.96 0.82 -0.09 
% of negative abnormal returns 60.27 59.21 80.77 68.83 63.38 58.82 
 
      Panel B: Value weighted market-adjusted returns 
      Sample return 31.15 19.38 -23.45 -5.72 22.97 11.84 
Benchmark return 12.32 13.00 9.51 9.92 6.04 4.77 
Abnormal return 18.83 6.38 -32.95*** -15.64** 16.92 7.07 
T-statistic 1.27 0.71 -5.35 -2.33 1.29 0.73 
% of negative abnormal returns 58.90 55.26 76.92 63.64 50.70 55.88 
 
      Panel C: Matched sample-adjusted returns 
      Sample return 34.58 19.85 -20.05 -7.57 27.42 8.46 
Benchmark return 18.52 20.88 16.82 29.33 56.59 5.44 
Abnormal return 16.06 -0.93 -36.86*** -36.90*** -29.17 3.02 
40 
 
T-statistic 0.84 -0.09 -2.79 -2.98 -1.27 0.35 
% of negative abnormal returns 51.61 56.52 73.97 57.75 65.63 50.00 
































Table 12: Regression analysis of post-turnover firm performance 
This table reports the results of six regression models, in which the dependent variables are the equally weighted market index-adjusted abnormal return, the 
value weighted market index-adjusted abnormal return, the matched group-adjusted abnormal return, the change in unadjusted OROA, the change in 
industry-adjusted OROA, and the change in matched group-adjusted OROA. The independent variables include the CEO’s cash compensation 
(Compensation), the percentage of shares owned by the CEO (CEO ownership), the CEO’s age (Age), a dummy variable that equals to one if the CEO is an 
insider (Insider CEO), a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board (CEO-Chairman), the number of directors sitting on the 
board (Board size), the percentage of outside directors on the board (Outside directors), the one year lagged buy-and-hold abnormal return (Lagged BHAR), a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm increases its number of geographic segments (Segment increase), a dummy variable that equals one if the firm 
decreases its number of geographic segments (Segment decrease), a dummy variable that equals one if a subsequent turnover event occurs (Turnover), and the 























































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Median unadjusted operating return on assets (OROA) around CEO turnover events 
The sample period for each firm is three years before through three years after the turnover 
year. OROA is operating return on assets, calculated as operating income before depreciation 




Figure 2: Median industry-adjusted operating return on assets (OROA) around CEO turnover 
events 
The sample period for each firm is three years before through three years after the turnover 
year. OROA is operating return on assets, calculated as operating income before depreciation 
divided by total assets. Industry-adjusted OROA is adjusted by subtracting the Fama French 













































Year relative to CEO turnover 
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Figure 3: Median matched group-adjusted operating return on assets (OROA) around CEO 
turnover events 
The sample period for each firm is three years before through three years after the turnover 
year. OROA is operating return on assets, calculated as operating income before depreciation 
divided by total assets. Matched group-adjusted OROA is adjusted by subtracting matched 




Figure 4: Median unadjusted operating return on assets (OROA) of no multiple turnover firms 
and multiple turnover firms 
The sample period for each firm is three years before through three years after the turnover 
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No multiple turnover firms Multiple turnover firms 
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Figure 5: Median unadjusted operating return on assets (OROA) of insider succession firms 
and outsider succession firms 
The sample period for each firm is three years before through three years after the turnover 




Figure 6: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using equally weighted market index returns 
as a benchmark 
The sample period of short-term stock returns is thirty days before through thirty days after 
the turnover announcement date. Abnormal return is calculated as the difference between 
the actual return (        ) and the expected return (   ) on day t:      
            , where expected returns is predicted using equally weighted market 
index returns:                . The CAR starting at time    through time    is 
calculated as:                
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Figure 7: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using value weighted market index returns as 
a benchmark 
The sample period of short-term stock returns is thirty days before through thirty days after 
the turnover announcement date. Abnormal return is calculated as the difference between 
the actual return (        ) and the expected return (   ) on day t:      
            , where expected returns is predicted using value weighted market index 
returns:                . The CAR starting at time    through time    is 
calculated as:                
  




Figure 8: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using S&P 500 market index returns as a 
benchmark 
The sample period of short-term stock returns is thirty days before through thirty days after 
the turnover announcement date. Abnormal return is calculated as the difference between 
the actual return (        ) and the expected return (   ) on day t:      
            , where expected returns is predicted using S&P 500 market index 
returns:                 . The CAR starting at time    through time    is 
calculated as:                
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Figure 9: Equally-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of no multiple turnover 
firms and multiple turnover firms 
The sample period for each firm is three years before through three years after the turnover 




Figure 10: Equally-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of insider succession 
firms and outsider succession firms 
The sample period for each firm is three years before through three years after the turnover 
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